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 Abstract: In the paper a study is presented for the case if a 10-4/a annual probability design 
basis earthquake would hit area surrounding the Nuclear Power Plant Paks. Although the plant 
can be brought to safe shutdown condition and there is no need for off-site protective measures, 
the plant personnel will need a minimum of logistical support from and communication with the 
outside area. Therefore, the knowledge of the post-earthquake situation is required for planning of 
the logistical support of the plant accident management and for the understanding the working 
conditions for disaster management services. Parameters of the case-study earthquake are selected 
in accordance with the design basis of the plant. Distribution of population and housing data used 
in this study has been obtained by population census held in 2011. The study can also help to 
communicate the seismic safety of the plant showing the disastrous consequences of design basis 
earthquake while the plant remains safe. 
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1. Introduction 
 Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) have to be designed for all foreseeable at the site 
external hazards that can adversely affect the plant safety. According to the international 
practice, the frequency of the core damage and the early large release of radioactive 
substances into the environment have to be limited to the values of 10-5/a and 10-6/a, 
respectively. Because of these limitations, criterion for damage parameters of the 
hazards to be accounted in the design is set to the level of 10-4÷10-5 probabilities per 
annum. Proper design of the plant ensures that the Systems, Structures and Components 
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(SSCs) that required for ensuring the plant safety remain functional both during and 
after the external event avoiding melting of the reactor core. The structures and systems 
required for accident management have to remain functional even in case of beyond 
design basis external events. The plant staff and the disaster management services of the 
country have to be prepared to manage extreme events and mitigate their consequences. 
This requirement has been formulated after the Fukushima accident and also adopted in 
the national regulations [1] and [2].  
 In general, the plant design includes also the plant and site layout, which are very 
important for safety in relation to external hazards. However, the emergency planning 
and response requires evaluation of the consequences of external events beyond the 
scope of the plant design. An extreme disastrous rare external event will cause 
catastrophic consequences in large area around the plant site. The post-event conditions 
around the site affect the logistical support of the emergency actions at the plant, 
influence the psychological condition of the plant personnel, and determine the 
workload of the country’s disaster management personnel.  
 In the paper a hypothetical case study is presented: What would happen outside of 
the Paks Nuclear Power Plant, if a 10-4 annual probability earthquake would happen? In 
this case the plant should be brought to safe shutdown condition thanks to the seismic 
safety upgrading measures implemented and there is no need for off-site protective 
measures [3]. Although the plant safe shutdown is ensured, the plant personnel will 
need a minimum of logistical support from and communication with the outside area. 
Therefore the results of the study can be used for planning of the logistical support of 
the plant accident management staff. The study also contributes to better understanding 
the working conditions of the disaster management services in the area of the nuclear 
power plant. The importance of assessment of post-event situation has been recognized 
by competent authorities in Hungary; see, e.g. [4], [5] and [6]. The importance of 
systematic planning for disaster management is recognized in countries endangered by 
natural hazards. There are plenty of studies related to loss estimation methodology (see, 
e.g. [7]), and the principles for resilience and disaster management are summarized e.g. 
in [8] and [9]. However, there are rather limited examples for detailed earthquake 
damage forecasts for low-to-moderate seismicity regions [10], [11].  
 The study can help to communicate the seismic safety of the plant via demonstrating 
the disastrous conditions that may happen in case of design basis earthquake while the 
plant remains safe. The parameters (magnitude, focal depth and possible distance from 
the site) of the case-study earthquake are selected in accordance with the design basis of 
the Paks Nuclear Power Plant). For evaluation of the damages of the built environment 
instrumental intensity map (shake-map) has been developed for the earthquake that is 
dominating the site seismic hazard. The distribution of population and housing data 
used in the study have been obtained by population census held in 2011 and published 
by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office [12]. Based on these data the damages have 
been assessed using European Macroseismic Intensity Scale [13] and the corresponding 
phenomenological definition of damages. This methodology can be considered as a 
simplification of the methods given in [10], [11] and [14].  
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2. Definition of the case-study earthquake 
 Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment (PSHA) performed for the Paks NPP site 
provides the hazard curves for probability levels up to 10-7 annual probabilities of 
exceedance, as well as the Uniform Hazard Response Spectra for the base-rock. 
Deaggregation of the hazard has been performed for 10-4/a (see Fig. 1).  
 
Fig. 1. Magnitude-distance deaggregation for 10-4/a level peak ground acceleration 
 According to this, an earthquake of moment magnitude 5.8-6.0 at an epicentral 
distance of ~10 km from the plant site is dominating in the hazard. The free-field 
ground motion has been obtained by non-linear site response analysis. The design basis 
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) is equal to 0.25 g. For comparison, a PGA of 0.09 g 
had to be accounted for the Paks site, if the EUROCODE 8 would be applied for a very 
important structure with 50 years’ service life. 
 Based on the seismic hazard assessment of Paks NPP site, two scenarios has been 
chosen for the study as follows:  
1. An earthquake of M=6.2 is assumed to occur at ~10 km epicentral distance 
North-East from the NPP site (Dunapataj, coordinates: 46.64; 19:00);  
2. The same size earthquake as defined above happens in the vicinity of the plant. 
 Analysis of the first scenario provides an insight how devastating could be and 
earthquake comparable to the plant Design Basis Earthquake for the area nearby  
the site.  
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 Analysis of the second case provides an impression, what would happen in the 
settlements where dwellings of the majority of the plant personnel are located. The 
second case analysis also demonstrates the logistical hurdles in supporting the work of 
plant emergency services personnel. 
 The intensity map of the second scenario looks like practically identical to the 
intensity map plotted in Fig. 2. The basic difference is that city Paks and the 
surrounding the sites villages are impacted in this case since the epicentre of the quake 
is moved to the NPP site.  
 
Fig. 2. Instrumental intensity map of the Scenario 1 earthquake 
 The local soil conditions strongly influence the damages in housing and 
infrastructure caused by the earthquake. The plant site located at the contact area of 
aerial loess sediments of Transdanubia and very thick fluvial sediments of Great 
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Hungarian Plain. At the flood-plain of the Danube the surface is covered by 
Pleisctocene fluvial gravel, gravelly sand (7-10 m), sand, fine grained sand (10-15 m) 
and Holocene fluvial fine grained sand, gravel, eolic sand. Under relatively thin 
Quaternary sediments there are several hundred meters of Pannonian and underlying, 
variable Miocene layers. The West side of the area is covered mainly wind-blown 
Quaternary sediments, mainly loess. Under these 20-100 m thick Quaternary layers lie 
Upper Pannonian layers on the whole territory. At the flood plain continuous shallow 
groundwater regime is in place that is influenced by the Danube level. Depth of ground 
water level is about 7-10 m below ground surface or even less at many places. The 
uppers soil at the flood-plain can be classified as C or D according to EUROCODE 8 
while the soil at West side belongs mainly to the class B and C. The loose, saturated and 
non-cohesive sandy soils susceptible to liquefaction that appears as an additional hazard 
to the earthquake and may cause some further damages. Earthquake sites with similar 
soil conditions show the evidences of liquefaction hazard cases [7].  
3. Distribution of population and housing data 
 There are 75 settlements with 220911 inhabitants in the 30 km radius area around 
Paks Nuclear Power Plant. The settlements could be divided to 11 towns (Dunaföldvár, 
Gyönk, Hajós, Kalocsa, Kecel, Kiskőrös, Paks, Simontornya, Solt, Szekszárd and 
Tolna) and to 64 villages. The town-village and population-ratio in 2012 was 58.1%. In 
the 10 km radius area around the NPP live 41590 people. The settlements are: 
Dunapataj, Fadd, Gerjen, Ordas, Tengelic, Dunaszentbenedek, Foktő, Györköny, Paks, 
Uszód, Dunaszentgyörgy, Géderlak, Madocsa and Pusztahencse. The only town is  
here Paks. 
 At the census of 2011 in the statistical unit of Paks, Kalocsa and Szekszárd the  
44.3-55.0% of the residences were bricks masonry buildings. The adobe-walled 
buildings ratio was about 20.1-30.0% in Tolna County and around 30.1-39.8% in Bács-
Kiskun County. Basic data are shown in Table I and Table II.  
Table I 
Type of buildings in villages of Bács-Kiskun County 
Type of structure Shear, % 
brick, stone, masonry hand-made 40.9 
medium or large block, cast concrete 6.1 
panel 0.1 
wood 0.3 
adobe, mud with foundation 33.2 
adobe, mud without foundation 18.1 
others 1.3 
Total: 100 
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Table II 
Type of buildings in cities of Bács-Kiskun County (except Kecskemét) 
Type of structure shear, % 
brick, stone, masonry hand-made masonry 48.1 
medium or large block, cast concrete 7.4 
panel 7.6 
wood 0.2 
adobe, mud with foundation 25.1 
adobe, mud without foundation 10.4 
others 1.3 
Total: 100 
 The brick/masonry structures as well as the adobe structures dominate (92.2%) in 
the villages. The 28% of the residences were built before 1946. In the Bács-Kiskun 
cities (except Kecskemét) the shear of brick masonry is dominating and the shear of 
adobe buildings is much less than in those in the villages. In the cities 21% of the 
residences were built before 1946. The construction date has practical importance since 
the newly constructed buildings with reinforced masonry walls have rather high shear  
resistance [15]. 
 The shear of adobe structures in Tolna County varies between 20 and 31%, i.e. it is 
significantly less than in Bács-Kiskun County.  
4. Assessment of damages 
 The expected damages have been assessed in accordance with European 
Macroseismic Intensity Scale, identifying the Vulnerability Class of the structure and 
assessing the expected damages in correlation with EMS intensity scale.  
 The definition of quantities is always centered to the most probable as follows: a few 
~5%; many 30-40%; most 70-100%. The grades of damages are as follows: 
• Grade 5, very heavy structural damage (total or near total collapse); 
• Grade 4, heavy structural damage, very heavy non-structural damage (serious 
failure of walls; partial structural failure of roofs and floors); 
• Grade 3, moderate structural damage, heavy non-structural damage (large and 
extensive cracks in most walls; roof tiles detach; chimney fracture at roof-line); 
• Grade 2, moderate damage, slight structural moderate non-structural damages 
(cracks in infill walls, falling mortar); 
• Grade 1, negligible to slight damage, no structural damage, slight non-structural 
damage (fine cracks in partitions and infill). 
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 The expected damages for all vulnerability classes and for the intensities VII and 
VIII are described in Table III.  
 The damages nearly all dwellings in the affected area and the unavoidable damages 
of the infrastructure will affect 5000 to 7000 people in the area. In this case the situation 
in western part of the Danube, e.g. in Paks and nearby villages are less severe (see 
Table III).  
Table III 
Expected damages in case of intensity VII and VIII 
Vulnerability class of structures Intensity VII Intensity VIII 
A 
adobe 
Many buildings (30-40%) 
suffer damage of Grade 3. 
A few (~5%) buildings 
suffer damage of Grade 4. 
Many buildings (30-40%) 
suffer damage of Grade 4. 
A few (~5%) buildings 
suffer damage of Grade 5. 
B 
brick masonry 
Many buildings (30-40%) 
suffer damage of Grade 2;  
A few (~5%) buildings 
suffer damage of Grade 3.  
Many buildings (30-40%) 
suffer damage of Grade 3.  
A few (~5%) buildings 
suffer damage of Grade 4.  
C 
reinforced masonry, frame non 
designed for earthquake 
A few buildings (~5%) 
sustain damage of Grade 2. 
Many buildings (30-40%) 
suffer damage of Grade 2.  
A few (~5%) buildings 
suffer damage of Grade 3.  
D 
frame (earthquake resistance) 
A few buildings (~5%) 
sustain damage of Grade 1. 
A few buildings (~5%) 
sustain damage of Grade 2. 
4.1. Consequences of a Scenario 1 earthquake 
 Assuming that a Scenario 1 earthquake happens, and applying the damage rates 
given in the Table III to the adobe (class A) and brick masonry buildings (class B and 
C) in the villages in Bács-Kiskun County (Table I), the damages in these villages can be 
obtained as it is shown in Table IV. 
 The masonry buildings evaluated in Table IV are of 92% of the total number of 
buildings in the villages in Bács-Kiskun County. Particularly, the expected damages for 
the Scenario 1 and within the area of intensity VIII are shown in Table V. The damages 
nearly all dwellings in the affected area, and the unavoidable damages of the 
infrastructure will affect 5000 to 7000 people in the area. 
 In this case the situation in western part of the Danube, e.g. in Paks and nearby 
villages are less severe, since this area is in the area of the intensity VII (see Table III 
for the differences between intensity VII and VIII damage rates). 
4.2. Consequences of a Scenario 2 earthquake 
 From the point of view of logistical support of the plant emergency personnel the 
situation in Paks and in the nearby villages are of most interest. From this point of view 
the Scenario 2 has to be evaluated, when the epicenter is just below the site and the 
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intensity area covers more the settlements where the operating personnel is living. The 
results of damage assessment for Paks are shown in Table VI.  
Table IV 
Expected damages in villages of Bács-Kiskun County  
Type of 
structure 
Vulnerability 
Class 
Shear, 
% 
Vulnerability rate in the 
area with radius 10 km 
EMS VIII - heavily 
damaging 
Vulnerability rate in the 
area between 10 to 30 km 
radius 
EMS VII, damaging 
Adobe A 51.3 
− many, 30-40% of the 
buildings suffer 
Grade 4 damage 
− few, ~5% of the 
buildings suffer 
Grade 5 damage 
− many, 30-40% of the 
buildings suffer 
grade 3 damage 
− few, ~5% of the 
buildings suffer 
grade 4 damage 
brick B 40.9 
− many, 30-40% of the 
buildings suffer 
Grade 3 damage 
− few, ~5% of the 
buildings suffer 
Grade 4 damage 
− many, 30-40% of the 
buildings suffer 
Grade 2 damage 
− few, ~5% of the 
buildings suffer 
Grade 3 damage.  
brick 
building 
with wreath 
B/C 
Table V 
Expected damages in the area of intensity VIII for Scenario 1 
Buildings inside EMS VIII area Damaged, % of total 
Number of 
damaged 
houses  
brick, stone, masonry hand-made masonry 1018 50% Grade 3 
20% Grade 4 713 
medium or large block, cast concrete blocks 151 50% Grade 3  75 
panel 2 
non-significant type 0 
wood 7 
adobe with foundation 826 ≈80% Grade 4 826 
adobe without foundation 450 ≈20% Grade 5 450 
others 34 non-significant type 0 
Total: 2487 
 
2064 
 Practically two third of the buildings in Paks will be significantly damaged and 
nearly twenty thousand people will be affected by the consequence of the earthquake. 
The conditions in the town will be near catastrophic that cause essential psychological 
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pressure on the personnel on duty and hinder the logistical support of the plant from 
outside.  
 Table VII consists the results for Dunaszentgyörgy that village also can be 
considered as a typical settlement, where also rather large number of plant personnel is 
living. 
Table VI 
Expected damages in the area of intensity VIII for Scenario 2 
Buildings inside EMS VIII area Damaged, % of total 
Number of 
damaged 
houses  
brick, stone, masonry hand-made masonry 2839 50% Grade 3 
20% Grade 4 
1987 
medium or large block, cast concrete blocks 526 50% Grade 3  263 
panel 482 20% Grade 3 96 
wood 12 non-significant type 0 
adobe with foundation 534 ≈80% Grade 4 534 
adobe without foundation 289 ≈20% Grade 5 289 
others 67 non-significant type 0 
Total: 4750 
 
3169 
Table VII 
Expected damages in the area of intensity VIII for Scenario 2 
Buildings inside EMS VIII area Damaged, % of total 
Number of 
damaged 
houses  
brick, stone, masonry hand-made masonry 522 50% Grade 3 
20% Grade 4 365 
medium or large block, cast concrete blocks 38 50% Grade 3  19 
panel 0 
non-significant type 0 
wood 0 
adobe with foundation 237 ≈80% Grade 4 237 
adobe without foundation 202 ≈20% Grade 5 202 
others 24 non-significant type 0 
Total: 1023 
 
823 
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 The earthquake consequences are even more severe in the villages around the plant. 
In Dunaszentgyörgy 80% of the houses will be significantly damaged and 2520 people 
will be affected by the earthquake. 
5. Other damages caused by earthquake 
 Large part of the Pannonian Basin is covered by young Holocene fluvial sediments 
with high ground water level. Despite its moderate seismicity, several liquefaction cases 
have been documented during larger historical earthquakes, latest in Kecskemét (1911) 
and Dunaharaszti (1956). The soil at the investigated flood plain is highly susceptible to 
liquefaction [16]. Liquefaction affects the stability of the buildings causing additional 
losses to those listed from Table IV to Table VII. The high-voltage towers and the 
lifelines (water and gas piping) can also fail due to differential soil settlements. Roads 
and dykes can likewise be damaged due to liquefaction. Contrary to these the 
liquefaction causes limited damages of plant structures and the fundamental safety 
functions will be ensured [17] and [18]. 
 There are several non-fixed loess slopes in the affected earthquake area that are 
susceptible to sliding due to ground shakings, e.g. along the old main road No 6 north 
to Paks.  
 The secondary phenomena (slope-sliding, liquefaction) also worsen the post-
earthquake situation. Vulnerability of lifelines is also worth of investigations; see, e.g. 
[19]. Important secondary effect of the damages are the fires that are sometimes more 
severe than the effects due to vibratory ground motion.  
6. Damage of the electrical grid 
 In case of design basis earthquake, the NPP basic safety functions are ensured and 
cooling water and emergency power supply are ensured. However, the electrical grid 
will suffer huge damages, since the towers of the grid have been designed for wind and 
ice loads assuming that the (100 years) earthquake loads are bounded with lateral wind 
loads. Due to the damages of the grid, nearly half of the domestic production will fall 
out from the power system that causes the collapse of the national grid. The Hungarian 
Independent Transmission Operator Company Ltd (MAVIR) has a recovery plan for the 
grid. Rebuilding of the grid could last from several hours to several days, depending on 
the severity of the damages. The NPP could stay in safe mode minimum one week or 
unlimited long if the fuel supply for emergency diesel generators is continuous. It is also 
possible to operate one of the units on the reduced power level and ensure safe power 
supply for all units. The substation and the high-voltage towers at the NPP site have 
been upgraded for the design basis earthquake and these infrastructures will withstand 
the earthquake. Thus, the NPP will be a stable connection point for restoring the 
national grid as fast as possible. Since the NPP is the biggest producer in the country it’s 
impossible to restore the grid without the NPP. If all units are out of operation then for 
the restart for the first unit needs offsite power. Therefore there are two independent 
transmission lines tested to transmit ~ 20 MW capacity to the NPP.  
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7. Conclusions 
 Case studies performed provide insight what damages and post-earthquake situation 
can be expected when a design basis earthquake with return period ten thousand years 
hit the Paks Nuclear Power Plant. The damages of the housing in the area will be rather 
catastrophic while the basic safety function of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant is ensured. 
The detailed evaluation of the post-earthquake situation in the area around the plant site 
helps us to prepare the emergency and recovery programs. 
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